Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1983

Golden Key Realty, Inc. And W. Peter Brandley v. P.J. Mantas : Brief
of Appellant

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Douglas T. Hall; Attorney for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Golden Key Realty v. Mantas, No. 19083 (1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4635

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GOLDEN KEY REALTY, INC. and
W. PETER BRANDLEY,
Plaintiff-Respondents
vs.

Case No. 19083

p. J. MANTAS ,
Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from Judgment in favor of the Respondents
by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
Utah, the Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge, presiding.

DOUGLAS T. HALL of
ZOLL & HALL
235 South Main
Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

DAVID E. WEST of
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS, WEST & BROWN
1300 Walker Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondents

FI l ED
jl:JN : 5 i98J
.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

VJ.

KEY REALTY,
PETFR BRANDLEY,

INC. and

Plaintiff-Respondents
vs.

Case No. 19083

P. J. f'o'ANTAS,
Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from Judgment in favor of the Respondents
by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
Utah, the Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge, presiding.

DOUGLAS T. HALL of
?OLL & HALL
235 South Main
Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

nAVID F. WEST of
ARMSTWlNG, PA\"ILINGS, WEST & BRO\"IN
1100 Walker Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Attorney for Respondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1'1'.SES AND AUTHORITIES CITED

ii

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

1

OISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

1

PELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

ST!,TEr1F'JT OF :11\TERIAL FACTS

2

POINT I
THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
THAT REQUIRE THAT ANY SUBSEQUENT AGREE'1ENT WHICH ALTERS OR AMENDS AN AGREEMENT
PEQUIRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS TO BE
Hl WRITING MUST ALSO BE IN WRITING HAS
NO APPLICATION TO AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION

4

POINT II
A COURT SHOULD NOT TAKE ANY ISSUES FROM
THE JURY UNLESS IT IS PLAIN THAT THERE
IS REALLY NO CONFLICT IN THE EVIDENCE
UPON WHICH REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER
1'()>JCLL:S ION

7
9

i

CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED
\merican Jurisprudence 2d, Vol 1

7

v. Stevens School of Business, Inc.,
0io----P:-2d 1363 (Utah 1977)
r:hristensen v. Abbott, 595 P.2d 900
Cummings v. Arnold,

(Utah 1979).

3 Met. 486 (Mass. 1842).

4.

5
6

7

Flinn v.
Harlin Construction Company,
ii) Ctah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973).

8

Gaido v. Tysdal, 235 P.2d 741

6

(Wyo. 1951)

Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson,
604 P. 2d 913 (Utah 1979)

7

Strevell-Paterson Co., Inc. v. Francis,
646 P. 2d 741 (Utah 1982)

4

Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson,
610 P. 2d 1369 (Utah 1980)

4

Words and Phrases, Vol 40 (1964)

5

Zions First National Bank v. Johnson,
fi41 P.2d 158 (Utah 1982)

5

ii

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GOLDEN KEY REALTY, INC. and
W. PETER BRANDLEY,
Plaintiff-Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 19083

P. J. MANTAS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves the applicability of the requirements of the Statute of Frauds to an accord and satisfaction
and the application of the substantial basis test to evidence on issues taken from a jury.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter was tried in the Third Judicial District of
Salt Lake County before a jury, the Honorable Scott Daniels
presiding.

The jury returned a verdict based upon special

interroqatories.

Based upon that verdict the court entered

a judgment against the appellant in the amount of $5,625.00.
Thereafter, on motion of the respondents, the court amended
the judgment as against the appellant for the sum of
1

$18,000.00.

The court also dismissed the first, second and

third causes of action of the appellant's counterclaim.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant respectfully requests that the original
judgment of the trial court, based upon the jury's verdict,
be reinstated and that the case be remanded for trial on the
issues set forth in the first, second and third causes of
action of appellant's counterclaim.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
The parties entered into a written real estate listing
agreement whereby the respondents agreed to use reasonable
efforts to sell appellant's property located in Magna, Utah.
The listing period was for six months beginning March 4,
1981 and provided that the appellant would pay to the res-

pondents six percent of the sales price if the property was
sold during the listing period.

Several days prior to the

termination of the listing agreement the appellant, through
his own efforts, sold the property to a party not a contact
found through the efforts of the respondents.
The appellant disputed that the respondents had used
reasonable efforts to secure a buyer.

After the sale the

parties had discussions concerning the amount of the comm1°sion, if any, that the respondents were entitled to.

The

respondents orally agreed to accept $5,000.00 in [ull settle-

2

ment of their claim for a commission and the appellant
orally agreed to pay that amount.

The next day the appel-

lant tendered a check to the respondent in the amount of
$2,500.00.

The respondent accepted the check but indicated

that he would talk to an attorney about it.

Thereafter the

check was returned to the appellant and the respondents initiated legal proceedings in which it was claimed that because the property sold for $300,000.00 that a commission
was due them in the sum of $18,000.00.

The appellant

counterclaimed alleging that an accord and satisfaction had
been effected and, additionally, that the respondent had
breached his fiduciary duty to the appellant by conspiring
with a third party to procure the property for himself and
this third party on terms more favorable to them and disadvantageous to the appellant.
The case was submitted to a jury upon two special interrogatories.

These were answered as follows:

1.
Did the parties ever consummate an
accord and satisfaction or settlement of their
dispute?
Answer:

Yes.

2.
Did the plaintiff Peter Brandley fail
to use reasonable efforts to try to procure
a purchaser for the property?
Answer:

No.

The issues presented in appellant's counterclaim alleging fraud, conspiracy and breach of fiduciary duty were not
given to the jury.

The court ruled, after the presentation
3

of the evidence that there was insufficient evidence presented on these issues to allow them to go to the iury.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS THAT REQUIRE THAT
ANY SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT WHICH ALTERS OR AMENDS AN AGREEMENT
REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS TO BE IN WRITING MUST ALSO
BE IN WRITING HAS NO APPLICATION TO AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTIC',
This court defined accord and satisfaction on numerous
occasions and has held that an accord and satisfaction arises
where the parties to an agreement resolve that a given performance by one party, offered in substitution of the performance originally agreed upon, will discharge the obligation
created under the original agreement.
v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372

Sugarhouse Finance Co,
The Sugarhouse

(Utah 1980).

case is in line with previous decisions and the definition
of accord and satisfaction set forth in the 1977 case of
Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1363
(Utah 1977).

The jury in the instant case was instructed by

the court on accord and satisfaction and returned a verdict
finding that an accord and satisfaction had been consummated
by the parties.
The basis of respondents' motion to al tcr nr
judgment was that because the listing >l•Jr<'<"ment
to be in wri tinq by the Statute

Gf

.1ri 0 rHi

\·1,is

thP

requir••'d

Frauds that ""··· "1ter,it 1 '"

or amendment to that agreement must also be in wr1t1w1.
case of Strevell-Pate_r_son Co_:_• __I nc. v.

f'

r .1 ·1

• 1

c. ,

f,

4G P . \ l

The
7 1I

(l'tah 1982) was relied upon by the respondents as their
principle authority.

However, the doctrine expressed in the

Strevell-Paterson case does not apply to an accord and satisfaction.
Strevell-Paterson dealt with an action by a creditor against a guarantor of the debt wherein the guarantor claimed
that an oral agreement of the parties had released him of
his obligation.

This court held that the release or revo-

cation of an agreement to answer for the debt of another
must also be in writing.

The issue of an accord and satis-

faction was not addressed.
An accord and satisfaction is not an amendment or alteration of a previous agreement.
stituted for the original.

It is a new agreement sub-

Cannon v. Stevens School of

Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1363, 1386 (Utah 1977).

Generally,

it is a method of discharging a contract or settling a claim
arising from a contract by substituting a new and substitute
contract.

Zions First National Bank v. Johnson, 641 P.2d

158, 160 (Utah 1982).
tute."

The key words are "new" and "substi-

To substitute means to put into the place of another

person or thing, or to exchange.
p. 863

(1964).

Words and Phrases, Vol. 40,

Because an accord and satisfaction is a new

1greement that does not alter or amend, but replaces a prev1nus agreement, the Statute of Frauds does not apply.
several cases have specifically held that an accord and
satisfaction need not be evidenced by any formal instrument.

5

1 Am Jur 2d 303 (1962).

This court in the case of Christensen

v. Abbott, 595 P.2d 900 (Utah 1979) held that there is no requirement that an accord and satisfaction must be in writing.
In the Christensen case this court upheld the trial court's
finding that the parties had settled their dispute on the
payment of a prommissory note with an accord and satisfaction.
It was an oral agreement that canceled an $111,000.00 note.
Id. at 902.
The ruling in the Christensen case is in conformity with
the Wyoming case of Gaido v. Tysdal, 235 P.2d 741 (Wyo. 1951).
This case involved the sale of land and the timber thereon.
The court specifically held that a written contract for the
sale of land, while still executory, could be rescinded by
oral agreement.

Id. at 746.

But in discussing the case

the court said:
But the great weight of authority supports
the rule that the statute of frauds has no application where there has been a full and complete
performance of the contract by one of the contracting parties .
This is similar to the facts in the instant case where
it can be said that the respondent had completed his performance under the listing agreement.

The court in Gaido went

on to state:
The general rule permitting written
contracts to be abrogated or rescinded by an
oral agreement is fully applicable to contracts
required by the statute of frauds to be in
writing; and such a contract may be the subject of an oral accord and sat1sfact1on .
Id. at 748.

6

The United States Supreme Court has ruled on this issue.
In the case of Cummings v. Arnold, 3 Met. 486 (Mass. 1842),
dealing with the question of whether or not a subsequent
parole ageement for the sale of printing cloth might be given
into evidence on a written contract the Supreme Court held
that oral agreements, similar to a plea of accord and satisfaction, not being with the statute of frauds, should be
admitted into evidence.

Id. at 492, 494.

Because an accord and satisfaction is a new agreement,
not a modification of the original, a consideration of the
defense of the Statute of Frauds to its being effective is
not necessary.

1 Arn Jur 2d 49 (1962).
POINT II

A COURT SHOULD NOT TAKE ANY ISSUES FROM THE JURY UNLESS IT
IS PLAIN THAT THERE IS REALLY NO CONFLICT IN THE EVIDENCE
UPON WHICH REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER.
In ruling on motions which would take issues of fact away from a jury the trial court must look at the evidence
and all reasonable inferences that reasonably may be drawn
therefrom and grant the motion only if there is no substantial basis therein which would support a verdict in favor
of the party being moved against.

Mel Hardman Productions,

Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1979).

On appeal

this court looks at the evidence in the same manner. Id.
The appellant presented evidence at trial that the respondent indicated to the property's purchaser that he had a

7

personal interest in acquiring the appellant's property
an old friend and business associate who was also the party
that the respondent attempted, on several occasions, to
arrange the sale of the property to.

This evidence formed

the basis of appellant's counterclaim for fraud, conspiracy
and breach of fiduciary duty.

Sale of the property to the

respondent's friend would have been, under the proposed terms,
advantageous to the buyer at the expense of the appellant.
It is possible that the jury could have found that
the evidence was sufficient to substanttate at least one, if
not all of appellant's alleged counterclaims.

It was not

plain that there was really no conflict in the evidence upon
which reasonable minds could differ.

This is the standard

as set forth in the case of Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Construction
Company, 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973):
It has long been established in our law
that a court should not take the case from the
jury where there is any substantial dispute in
the evidence on issues of fact, but can properly
do so only when the matter is so plain that
there really is no conflict in the evidence
upon which reasonable minds could differ. As
was said for this court long ago by the greatly
respected Justice Frick:
. unless the question is free from
doubt, the court cannot pass upon it as a
matter of law .
Id. at 361.
The application of the standard set forth above to the
facts in the instant case would have allowed the jury to
a determination of the validity of all of appellant's counter
claims.
8

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred
in amending the original judgment rendered upon the verdict
on special interrogatories returned by the jury and in not
allowing the jury to rule upon all of appellant's counterclaims.

Appellant respectfully urges this Court to rein-

state the original judgment and to remand for trial the
issues of fraud, conspiracy and breach of fiduciary duty as
set forth in appellant's counterclaim.
DATED this

/Sfi

day of June, 1983.
Respectfully submitted,

Attorney for DefendantAppellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

of June, 1983,

delivered to the office of David E. West, attorney for the
plaintiff-respondents, two copies of the foregoing brief.
Delivery was made to 1300 Walker Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah.
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